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ABSTRACT
SONY PICTURES AND THE U.S. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: A CASE STUDY
ANALYSIS OF THE SONY PICTURES ENTERTAINMENT HACK CRISIS USING
NORMAL ACCIDENTS THEORY
by Mohamed Ismail
December2017
In this case study, I analyze the 2014 North Korean computer database hack of
Sony Pictures Entertainment (SPE), a serious national security crisis of cyberterrorism. I
utilize Normal Accidents theory as a lens, to help explain how the accident within one
system (SPE) and later crisis lead to the interaction with a second system (U.S. Federal
Government), the development of a new crisis, and the need for a crisis response from
system two. The evolution of a single organization’s accident into a national security
crisis does not occur without specific complex interactions that take place to connect the
two systems together. To explain this interconnectedness between systems, I introduce
two new constructs: 1) common denominator and 2) common goal, which expand
Normal Accidents theory allowing it to account for the coupling between the two
independent systems (SPE & United States Government) through non-linear interactions.
Overall, this case study provides important insight for future crisis communication
planning, response, and development regarding between-organization interaction during a
crisis.
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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION
The 2014 North Korean computer database hack of Sony Pictures Entertainment
(SPE) stormed to the forefront of the nation’s attention as not just a great piece of
celebrity news, but as a serious national security crisis of cyberterrorism. This cyber
terrorist attack in its early stages was presumed to be a hoax. However, as it transpired
and email threats were followed through by action it became evident that this was indeed
a crisis that needed national security intervention.
Many Americans are familiar with the concept of terrorism, and upon hearing the
word can automatically conjure a specific mental picture in connection (Hermann, 1984).
The American Civil Code defines terrorism as “premeditated violence, politically
motivated against civilians, committed by local groups or clandestine agents, in order to
influence a target audience” (American Civil Code, as quoted by Paul, Bugnar, & Mester,
2015, p. 7). However, in this technological age terrorism can extend beyond our physical
world in forms that surpass the generic “violence” as noted in the above definition, and
this extension is known as cyberterrorism. “Cyberterrorism means premeditated,
politically motivated attacks by sub national groups, clandestine agents, or individuals
against information and computer systems, computer programs, and data that result in
violence against non-combatant targets” (Janczewski, 2007, xii). In turn, rather than a
physical act of terror cyberterrorism transforms terrorism to a virtual attack that is
boundless through an Internet world.
Cyberterrorism has proven to be of major concern for various reasons (e.g.,
privacy, security, economics, and freedom) organizationally, nationally, and
internationally (Atalay & Sanci, 2015; Yong-joon, Hyuk-jin, Jaeil, & Dong-kyoo, 2015).

1

Currently, with the social and financial lives of individuals being readily available and
accessible on the Internet, it allows for easier connectivity and takeover of that which
people hold valuable (Matusitz, 2014). The unsettling aspect of cyberterrorism is its
ability to take on any form to ruin its target; the spread of incorrect information, the
collapse of a computer system, and information altering are just a few of the methods
used via cyberterrorism to affect the target population (Kennedy, 2001; Matusitz, 2014;
Weimann, 2005).
The SPE hack serves as an act of cyberterrorism because the hackers –
“Guardians of Peace” – were later identified as a national Korean group (The White
House, 2015a). This group used this hack as a politically motivated attack against SPE’s
computer system to stop SPE from releasing its film – The Interview, which satirically
depicted the North Korean Supreme Leader, Kim Jong Un. This act of cyberterrorism
later transformed into a national security crisis once it negatively impacted American
values (freedom of speech), shut down a major non-combatant organization’s (SPE)
system, and destroyed certain private information of American citizens (SPE Employees).
Ultimately, the SPE hack is an exemplar of a crisis catalyzed through cyberterrorism as it
took control of a major corporation’s system via Internet connectivity, and consequently
shocked a nation’s sense of security and normalcy.
However, crises are not “one-size-fits-all” but vary in type and intensity (Seeger,
Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003). Generally, a ‘crisis’ is an “unusual event of overwhelmingly
negative significance that carries a high level of risk, harm, and opportunity for further
loss (Seeger et al., 2003, p. 3). Nonetheless, in Heath and O’Hair’s (2010) risk and crisis
communication handbook and Coombs and Holladay’s (2011) handbook on crisis
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communication they define crisis and crisis communication, and provide Coombs’
inclusive and holistic definition of crisis:
A crisis can be viewed as the perception of an event that threatens important
expectancies of stakeholders and can impact the organization’s performance.
Crises are largely perceptual. If stakeholders believe there is a crisis, the
organization is in a crisis unless it can successfully persuade stakeholders it is not.
A crisis violates expectations; an organization has done something stakeholders
feel is inappropriate. (Coombs, 2009, p. 100)
Based on the definition of crisis, the SPE hack is a more focused form of crisis, and can
be identified as an organizational crisis – “a specific unexpected and non-routine
organizationally based event or series of events which creates high levels of uncertainty
and threat or perceived threat to an organization’s high priority goals” (Seeger, Sellnow,
& Ulmer, 1998, p. 233) that was induced by an act of cyber terrorism.
Significance
Crisis communication literature has looked at various organizational crises to
study each organization’s mode of operation pre-crisis, during crisis, and post crisis (see:
Benoit, 1995; Coombs, 1999; Seeger, 2006; and Seeger, et al., 2003). Seeger (2006) notes
that there exists various crisis types and different dynamics within each crisis that
prompts crisis communication scholars to develop adequate strategies to address these
variances in crises. The Sony Pictures crisis is a unique case to study as it includes the
interconnectedness of two separate organizations, a private company – SPE – with a
public entity – U.S. Federal government – in response to a crisis. Therefore, it serves as a
novel organizational crisis to analyze for crisis strategy development. More importantly,
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this study is unique in that it uses Normal Accidents theory to better understand these
complex interactions between systems during a high stress crisis event. A between
systems crisis is when the crisis of one organization directly impacts a second
organization. In this case, the initial interaction is between Sony Pictures Entertainment
and the United States Federal Government; which later lead to a national security crisis
between the U.S. and North Korea.
Existing literature studying the interaction between two separate organizations in
response to the crisis of one does not explore this phenomenon using Normal Accidents
theory as its central point of analysis (See: Gotham, 2012; Millner, 2011; and Millner,
Veil, & Sellnow, 2011). Millner et al. (2011) highlights how third party organizations
within affiliated industries serve as proxy communicators in resolution of a crisis when
the main organization fails to appropriately respond. Gotham (2012) notes that the
implementation of policy from certain organizations (e.g., financial firms) can develop
problems in other organizations (e.g., mortgage market) and later lead to full-blown crisis
(e.g., 2007 U.S. financial housing crisis) via a cascading effect (i.e., Crisis-Policy Nexus).
However, these studies do not indicate how two varying systems interact through the
sharing of each other’s subsystems in response to the initial accident and later against the
unfolding of a new crisis.
Additionally, the existing literature does not highlight the interaction between a
private organization and a public entity, as shown in this case. Liu, Horsley, and
Levenshus (2010) identify the differences and similarities between government entities
and private sectors. However, these findings only indicate how the private and public
sector would individually communicate given the potential emergence of a situation. The
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study does not assess a “real-life” case where the two organizations interact and their
communication intersects in response to a specific happening. This current study does.
Thus, an analysis of the Sony Pictures hack crisis and its interaction with the U.S. Federal
government is of significance for communication scholars to better understand using
Normal Accidents theory as the underpinning that facilitates the interaction of these two
separate types of organizations during a crisis.
This evolution of a single organization’s crisis into a national security crisis does
not occur without specific communicative interactions that occur to connect organizations
together. Communication scholars have developed a plethora of research on the role
communication plays within organizational crises and the best practices for
organizational crisis management (Seeger, 2006). Coombs (2010) states that, "the reality
of crises leads to the need for preparation and readiness to respond – crisis management.
The critical component in crisis management is communication” (p. 17). Previous
research on crisis communication has primarily focused on crisis prevention and
management within one organization, but has fallen short in identifying strategies that
assist when one crisis effects two organizations of varying make-up simultaneously.
Therefore, it is essential to further expand the existing research on best practices and
communicative crisis management strategies to assist organizations in crises that involve
between-organization interaction.
In this paper, I uncover the role communication plays in between-organization
interaction during a crisis. I use Normal Accidents theory as the guiding theoretical
framework to analyze the case. Normal Accidents theory has only accounted for
accidents that manifest within one system. In turn, this study expands Normal Accidents
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theory’s reach allowing it to explain complex interactions between two systems.
Furthermore, I use an explanatory case study approach with descriptive analysis to
understand how the Sony Pictures hack became an organizational crisis, and why it
interacted with the U.S. Federal Government to then create a national security crisis.
Current crisis communication case study research usually focuses on a single
crisis and how it impacts the one organization’s operation (see: Venette, Sellnow, &
Lang, 2003). These case studies are used to highlight both the successes and failures of
organizations when managing their crises. In turn, researchers take these various case
study findings and develop a foundation of advice for future organizations regarding their
crisis plan (Coombs, 2010).
Using the case study approach, I identify how these two organizations interacted
with one another during a crisis. This extends the case study method within crisis
communication to include the analysis of interconnected crises that impact system wide
operations across multiple organizations from a Normal Accidents theory perspective. It
reveals how the failure of one organization (SPE) due to cyberterrorism negatively
impacts a second organization (United States Government) to create a greater
independent crisis – national security threat between the United States and North Korea.
Overview of Chapters
This study is arranged into the following chapters. Chapter two provides a review
of literature focusing on Normal Accidents theory and complex organizations. Chapter
three presents an overview of the methodological approach utilized – explanatory case
study with descriptive analysis under a single case study design. In it, I justify why case
study analysis was the qualitative method of choice for this research; I highlight how the
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data was collected; and finally, I discuss how the data was analyzed. Chapter four
provides detailed information regarding the SPE hack crisis case and stitches together its
evolution and transformation throughout the progression of the crisis using a timeline
narrative approach. Finally, chapter five discusses the pertinent conclusions of this
research project. Moreover, chapter five highlights implications, limitations, and future
research opportunities. The next chapter reviews literature applicable to this research.
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CHAPTER II - LITERATURE REVIEW
Theoretical Framework: Normal Accidents Theory
When crises occur, they are usually catalyzed via a specific occurrence that
disrupts the state of operational normalcy in an organization (Perrow 1999; and Seeger
2002). Crisis communication aims to establish proactive, pre-crisis, means against this
disruptive occurrence from ever happening. This proactive intervention can only be
established through a breadth of understanding related to the organizational make-up
where the crisis can take place (Coombs, 2014).
Charles Perrow (1999) argues that as human development continues to expand
through technology, political agendas, and globalization systems are created to account
and manage for this expansion, specifically technologically advanced systems. Systems,
as Perrow (1999) points, are organizations, and these systems in and of themselves
contain subsystems that constitute the organization’s internal infrastructure (from this
point forward ‘systems’ and ‘organizations’ will be used interchangeably). These systems
continue to grow in intricacy and complexity, which increases their “riskiness” and in
succession makes them predisposed to being of catastrophic potential. However, Perrow
(1999) argues that because of this increased complexity within systems these disruptive
occurrences become “normal accidents” that are inevitable due to the innate high-risk
nature of these organizations. An ‘accident’ is an unintentional occurrence that disrupts
normalcy by causing damage to people, objects, or both (Coombs & Holladay, 1996;
Perrow, 1999; Seeger 2002; and Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003). Thus, “if we can
understand the nature of risky enterprises better we may be able to reduce or even remove
these dangers” (Perrow, 1999, p. 3). More importantly, if accidents in increasingly

8

complex systems are normal and in turn inevitable, we as communication scholars must
identify means to address these accidents as an extension of the organization’s normalcy
without allowing them to manifest into crises.
Perrow (1999), through analysis of various high-risk system accidents, developed
Normal Accidents Theory, a theory that explains how organizational crises of
catastrophic consequences occur via accidents within systems due to their interactive
complexity. In this section, I explain the major concepts of Normal Accidents theory, and
justify why it is an appropriate and strong theoretical framework to analyze the Sony
Pictures hack crisis.
Perrow (1999) identifies that systems that are prone to these normal accidents are
‘complex’ systems; meaning, they are systems that consist of a multitude of variables that
could find themselves interconnected with one another out of sequence. These complex
systems differ greatly to their counterpart, linear systems, seeing as they do not operate in
a sequential (e.g., conveyer belt) mode of operation (Perrow, 2011). Linear systems are
identified as simple systems, compared to complex systems, as they can easily substitute
or replace any supplies and equipment during the occurrence of an accident, due to their
extensive availability. They accomplish this because of their “assembly line-like”
operational design. This allows for ease of maintenance and minimal disturbance to the
remainder of the system if a crisis were to occur during a malfunction of one component.
The variables in complex systems are known as subsystems - multiple moving parts
within the system that individually play a significant role to produce the overall system’s
final product. These subsystems can also be interdependent to where the malfunction of
one has the potential to impact the status of the other. Therefore, complex systems are
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usually referred to as ‘high-risk’ systems (e.g. chemical plants, aircraft carriers, and
nuclear plants).
These high-risk systems are complex because they consist of specialized
personnel and subsystems that are highly interactive with one another to accomplish their
system’s agenda (Perrow, 1967; 1984; 1999; and 2011). Although, complex systems
contain highly interactive subsystems, ‘complex interactions’ are usually “unfamiliar
sequences, or unplanned and unexpected sequences, and either not visible or not
immediately comprehensible” (Perrow, 1999, p. 78). They are complex interactions
because they occur outside of the organization’s normal production sequence between
two subsystems that are known to be unrelated in the system’s original design and
operation.
Thus, understanding the composition of a complex system and how it operates,
and the potentiality of complex interactions grants communication scholars a stronger
grasp on how to better diagnose a crisis that could happen within a similar organization.
As noted by Coombs and Holladay (1996), “characteristics of the crisis situation should
suggest to the crisis manager the best crisis response strategy or strategies to fit the
situation” (p. 284). For example, the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear plant in
1978 highlighted how the malfunction of one subsystem (condensate polisher) impacted
the malfunction of another subsystem (feed water pumps), and finally the failure of the
major subsystem (pilot-operated relief valve); which ultimately lead to the release of
radioactive gases into the environment (Perrow, 1999). From this example, crisis
communication scholars can diagnose and later identify the interactive complexity within

10

the system across its subsystems to suggest a crisis management plan grounded in human
intervention.
This human intervention is imperative in both the pre-crisis and crisis phase
during a normal accident in these high-risk systems. As Perrow (1999) notes, “normal
accidents stem from the mysterious interaction of failures, those closest to the system, the
operators, have to be able to take independent and sometimes quite creative action” (p.
10). This “operator action”, as Perrow puts it, is communicative at its core seeing as
multiple operators exist across various subsystems that have the potential of interacting.
Thus, the intervention or ‘action” produced by the operator in response to the first
subsystem’s failure during a crisis must be quickly and effectively communicated to other
operators across the system. Or, as Perrow (1999) suggests, “the communication must be
exact, the dial correct, the switch position obvious, the reading direct, and on-line” (p.
84). Other operators overseeing related subsystems must be made aware of the primary
subsystem’s malfunction promptly to prevent the failure of their subsystem. To
accomplish this, a crisis communication strategy that accounts for the possibility of these
accidents occurring must be in place for operators to be aware of how they should
intervene and who they should be contacting as the crisis unfolds. Normal Accidents
theory provides insight into how these ‘mysterious’ failures may occur in a complex
system, shedding light on the system’s high-riskiness based on its interactive complexity.
This interconnectivity is known as coupling.
Coupling is the degree of interconnectedness between components within a
system (Weick, 1976, 1982; Orton & Weick, 1990; and Perrow, 1984, 1999, 2011).
There exists two degrees of coupling – loose and tight. The looseness or tightness of
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coupling is the strength of the connection between two subsystems (Perrow, 2011).
Weick (1976) was the first to introduce the notion of coupling when he referred to
educational organizations as loosely coupled systems. A loosely coupled system is one
that contains subsystems that are aware of each other’s role but operate primarily in
isolation from one another (Burke, 2014; Green & Swanson, 2011; Perrow, 1984; 1999;
2011; and Weick, 1976; 1982). Loosely coupled systems have the advantage that
disruptions in one subsystem do not necessarily hinder the overall system’s operational
goal. Loosely coupled systems allow for various system components to operate freely
under their own interests without consequence of impacting another component within
the system. As Perrow (1999) notes, “loosely coupled systems tend to have ambiguous or
perhaps flexible performance standards, and they may have little consumer monitoring,
so the absence of the intended connection can remain unobserved” (p. 91). Thus, the
pressure to ensure that all components within a system operate exactly as required is
minimal in loosely coupled systems; because the end product’s creation is not dependent
on the precision in connection between components. However, the downfall of loosely
coupled systems is that they are not as efficient and have slower response time due to the
weak interconnectivity across the system.
Tight coupling, “is a mechanical term meaning there is no slack or buffer or give
between two items” (Perrow, 1999, p.90). Tight coupling is more prominent in extremely
high-risk, complex systems that have greater potential for catastrophic consequence in
result of a crisis. According to Weick (1976), tightly coupled systems carry four specific
criteria: 1) clearly defined rules; 2) organizational members agree on rules; 3) outcomes
from rules are clearly defined and a specific procedure is in place to identify when they
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are met; and 4) feedback loops are in place to verify the success of the system. He
stresses that what differentiates a tightly coupled system from a loosely coupled system is
a lack of agreement on a clearly defined process or rule.
Perrow (1999) expands on the four categories considering high-risk, complex
systems: 1) time dependent processes; 2) system sequences are invariant; 3) production
goal can only be reached one way; and 4) the system has little to no slack. Meaning, the
failure of one component results in a direct and quick change within another component.
Tight coupling makes for precision in process between subsystems as one relies on the
other for the final product to be produced correctly. A tightly coupled system does not
allow for various components to behave independently for its own agenda. Instead a
tightly coupled system is time-dependent and job-dependent, to where each component
must meet its assigned task in its scheduled time to ensure the successful operation of all
connected components within the system, and the accurate creation of the final product.
For example, a processing plant operates through tight coupling due to it being required
to alter its processes for market demands. This change in processes requires operators to
proceed quickly so that these changes are noted, reported, and executed with efficiency.
By contrast, if a processing plant were loosely coupled these changes in one component
would not be met with swift changes in another, and would result in inefficiencies
(Perrow, 1984; 1999; 2011).
Tightly coupled systems must be prompt in response to any distresses that may
occur to avoid disastrous consequences. However, tightly coupled systems cannot
incorporate substitutive aid in response to failure as there is no slack in the system for
such input. Instead, these buffers or substitutions are designed-in as part of the system
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from its inception. These designed-in aids increase the complexity of the system and
cannot always account for interactivity between subsystems that is unexpected. Hence,
Normal Accidents theory highlights how some failures that occur within the complex
systems are unexpected and can then result in full-blown catastrophes. The complex
interactions of a system are those that occur in an “unfamiliar and unexpected sequence
that is not visible or immediately comprehensible” (Perrow, 1999, p. 78). This complex
interactivity increases because of the tightly coupled and intricate design of the system
that is meant to account for all possibilities. Organizations then assume that the more
controls, guidelines, and procedures in place decrease the likelihood of an accident.
However, Normal Accidents theory suggests the exact opposite. This heightened
complexity in design and security increases the likelihood of unexpected interactions that
can exist between subsystems. This increase in interactions complicates the system
leading to unexpected sequences of failures during an accident that afterwards become a
catastrophe, and in turn a crisis. The following section discusses in detail the intricacies
related to complex organizations.
Complex Organizations
Much of Normal Accidents Theory highlights almost exclusively complex
systems that are technologically advanced and high-risk (e.g. chemical plants, nuclear
plants, air craft carriers, etc.). Many scholars have criticized Perrow for his overemphasis on technology’s role within normal accidents; identifying it as ‘technological
determinism’ (see: Le Coze, 2015). Perrow himself highlights in his writing that rooted in
his thesis of normal accidents is that technological advancements have become engrained
in systems making them highly complex. Though technology is a prominent theme in
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normal accidents, it does not erase the role that human behavior and intervention play
within complex systems. Vaughan (1996) expands normal accidents theory beyond just
technological determinism, and notes that the coexistence of technology and human
action can be present within complex systems. He highlights that accidents can occur via
the interaction of both technological mishaps and social forces: ‘complex and dynamic
techno-social coupling’ (Coze, 2015, p.277; and Vaughan, 1996). Therefore, normal
accidents do not only occur considering the complexity surrounding the system’s
advanced technology, but can occur due to the complexity of the system’s social patterns.
Thus, to qualify as a complex system there is no obligation to being only a
technologically high-risk system. Universities, major business corporations, and
government agencies serve as complex systems. These systems do not operate in linear
interactions, where sequences are familiar and expected, even visible when unplanned.
Thus, they are complex in the sense that various sub-systems within the overall system
have the potential to reach one another unexpectedly through various means of
interaction. Moreover, the looseness and tightness in coupling within such a complex
system are not mutually exclusive. As one system can include both loose and tight
subsystems within its infrastructure (Green & Swanson, 2011).
These complex systems are not strictly technologically advanced, high-risk
systems either, but can be multifaceted organizations; for example: public schools,
universities, or multi-departmental companies (Fusarelli, 2002; Perrow, 1991; Weick,
1982). This is key to note, in relation to this study, as SPE is a multi-departmental
production company that operates as a complex system. Unexpected interactions within a
multifaceted organization can occur between various departments against the system’s
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overall mission and result in a crisis (Fusarelli, 2002; Green & Swanson, 2011; Lutz,
1982; Perrow 1999; and Weick, 1976; 1982). These various departments serve as the
organization’s subsystems through the people that operate within them. Similar to a pump
in the turbine building of a nuclear plant, particular employees within a specific
department constitute that subsystem. For example, the disturbance in the payroll
department directly impacts other employee behavior, the goals of the organization, and
ultimately its output (Weick, 1982). Leadership must be able to juggle these various
demands and goals made of its organization, both the internal (across departments) and
external (stakeholders), to maintain cohesion and prevent any organizational failure from
happening that could lead to a potential crisis (Spender & Grinyer, 1995).
Perrow (1961) discusses the importance of goals in complex organizations.
Perrow distinguishes between “official goals” and “operative goals”. He notes that
official goals are the general-purpose statements made by organizations to fulfill its
legitimacy as an organization. Operative goals are the underlying tactics that are put in
place and used to achieve the official goals. For example, if the organization’s official
goal is to provide exceptional customer service, then its operative goal could be to ensure
that 90% of its customer base averages a 4/5 in customer satisfaction on the customer exit
survey. Operative goals allow organizations to operationalize how they are going to
achieve their official goals through measurable means. Thus, understanding the operative
goals of a complex organization allows for the organization to operate in line with
fulfilling its intended output. Though official and operative goals have been noted in the
literature regarding complex organizations; the interconnectivity of goals between two
differing complex organizations has not, nor is it accounted for in Normal Accidents
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theory or the literature surrounding complex organizations. Yet, it is worthy of notice to
clearly understand the inner workings of complex organizations and their operations, and
be able to identify the complexity of SPE as a system.
Summary
Since SPE meets the criteria of a multi-faceted organization, and thus, a complex
system, Normal Accidents theory will be used as a theoretical lens to understand the
organization’s complexity and interconnectivity to shed light on how its 2014 hack crisis
transpired and later became a national security crisis.
In sum, a “normal accident” is an inevitable phenomenon in complexly interactive
systems. Since it is inevitable, we as communication scholars must identify means to
address these accidents as an extension of the organization’s normalcy without allowing
them to manifest into crises through effective and proactive crisis management tactics.
This type of crisis management is possible through increased insight on how the overall
system and its sub-systems operate, and how human intervention can be taken in
instances of interactive system malfunction. The interactions between subsystems within
the system are found to be unexpected sequences that are not seen nor understood upon
their happening. The more complex the system, the more likely that a miniscule incident
may become catastrophic, due to the strong interdependency of its variables.
Rationale
It is evident through Normal Accidents theory how an unanticipated connection
between two independent and unrelated subsystems can occur through nonlinear
interactions (Perrow, 2011). In Normal Accidents theory, these two subsystems are
related to one major complex system, where a change in one results in a change in the
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other, and ultimately affects the system as a whole. This interaction of unexpected
sequences is due to the complexity of the system and the coupling between subsystems.
However, research utilizing Normal Accidents theory as the central point of
analysis to explain the manifestation of an accident and crisis through the interaction
between two independent and unrelated major, complex systems does not exist.
Therefore, the following study serves as important research showcasing Normal
Accidents theory’s versatility in explaining this phenomenon. In the following chapter, I
highlight the methodology of this study and how I used case study analysis to fill this gap
in research and understand this interaction between two independent complex systems –
Sony Pictures Entertainment and the U.S. Federal Government. Also, in the next chapter,
I detail how Normal Accidents theory was used as a theoretical lens to analyze the Sony
Pictures hack crisis.
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CHAPTER III - METHODOLOGY
The current gap in the organizational and crisis communication literature utilizing
Normal Accidents theory to understanding the interconnectedness between systems and
how one organization’s crisis leads to its interaction with a separate organization, and the
creation of an additional organizational crisis mandates an in-depth examination of this
phenomenon. In this study, I used case study analysis as the primary method to
understand how and why the Sony Pictures 2014 hack crisis lead to an interaction with
the United States Federal Government, which then created a national security crisis.
Throughout the analysis of the case, I used Normal Accidents theory as the guiding lens
to examine the case, its events, and the communicative underpinnings that established the
interaction between each organization. In this chapter, I first explain what case study
analysis is and the type of case study design that was conducted. Second, I justify why
case study analysis is the strongest methodology of choice for this study. Third, I provide
details on the data collection process. Finally, I discuss how the data was analyzed.
This study posed the following research question:
How did the normal accident within one system (SPE) cause an accident within a
separate system (U.S Federal Government) and later transpire into a national security
crisis.
Case Study Analysis
Case study analysis is a thorough examination of a phenomenon using various
types of evidence to explore and gain an in-depth understanding of that phenomenon. Yin
(2013) notes that case study is a form of research that allows researchers to “understand
complex social phenomena and gain a holistic and real-world perspective” (p. 674). The
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strength and popularity of case study analysis is it provides focus in gaining depth of
knowledge pertaining to a specific ‘case’ by placing boundaries to avoid too broad of
study. The ‘case’ is that which serves as the object of analysis or “phenomenon occurring
in a bounded context” (p. 25). Daymon and Holloway (2010) emphasize that case studies
are “intensive examination(s), using multiple sources of evidence, of a single entity [case]
which is bound by time and place” (p. 105). Other researchers highlight that the case can
be bound by time and activity (Stake, 1995), or definition and context (Miles &
Huberman, 1994). For the purposes of this research, the case was bound by time and
place: Sony Pictures Entertainment (SPE) hack crisis, November 24th, 2014 – January 2nd,
2015.
Based on the typology of case studies introduced by Yin (2003), in this study an
“explanatory case study using a single case study design” was employed to analyze the
SPE hack crisis. An explanatory case study is “a type of case study used to answer a
question to explain the presumed causal links in real-life interventions” (Baxter & Jack,
2008, p. 547). This explanatory case study reveals the communicative casual links
between the two organizations to explain how a crisis in one organization caused a
separate organization’s crisis.
The SPE hack crisis as a case meets Yin’s (2013) single case study design
rationales – 1) unusual circumstance and 2) testing an existing theory. Thus, the single
case study design is used to analyze the SPE hack crisis as an unusual circumstance – a
phenomenon that is peculiar, deviates, and contrasts with theoretical norms. Also, it tests
an existing theory – Normal Accidents theory – to ensure that the theory is stable in
accounting for SPE’s organizational accident. Additionally, the single case study design
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offers a “deep, narrow exploration” that granted a “detailed, descriptive, and holistic
view” of the case (Daymon & Hollaway, 2002, p. 108).
Ultimately, the case study analysis was fitting for this study in that it provided
depth of understanding on the SPE hack crisis as an unusual case that tested Normal
Accidents theory, while explaining how two separate organizations interacted during the
crisis of one. In the next section, I expound on why the case study analysis served as the
best method of choice for this study.
Why Case Study Analysis?
Crisis communication research focuses on how entities use various
communication strategies to respond to crisis, specifically how communication plays a
role in their pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis handlings. To accomplish this research goal,
crisis communication studies adopt case study analysis as a method of choice to “collect
‘rich’, detailed information across a wide range of dimensions about one particular case
or a small number of cases” (Daymon & Holloway, 2002, p.106) pertaining to the crisis
in study (see: Coombs & Holladay, 2011; Seeger, 2006; Sellnow & Littlefield, 2005;
Ulmer, 2001; Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000).
Case study analysis in the crisis communication arena is used to “increase
knowledge about real, contemporary communication events in their context” (Daymon &
Holloway, 2010, p. 105). The SPE hack crisis is a real and contemporary communication
event that serves as a unique case in connection to risk, crisis, and organizational
communication. Thus, a purposeful methodology must be employed to uncover and
understand the “many different influences and aspects of communication relationships
and experiences” that exist within this crisis (Daymon & Hollaway, 2010, p. 106). Case
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study analysis serves this purpose as it is designed to answer the “how” and “why”
questions related to a social phenomenon (Yin, 2013). Through its descriptive and
interpretive functions, it sheds light on the various complexities that control the
communicative aspects that make the case unique (Daymon & Hollaway, 2002; and
Sellnow & Littlefield, 2005). Therefore, in this study, to understand how the Sony
Pictures hack crisis came to be and why it interacted with the U.S. Federal Government
to create a national security crisis, case study analysis was employed to, as noted by
Daymon & Holloway (2010), “bring to life the nuances of managed communication by
describing a chunk of reality . . . and attempt to offer insights that have wider relevance”
(p. 106). These nuances are uncovered, in case study research, by gathering multiple
kinds of evidence that are pieced together to describe and explain the case.
More importantly, the case study analysis is a strong methodological choice
because it has the advantage of being able to utilize and navigate various types of
evidence to establish a thorough examination of the case. As Yin (2003) notes, “the case
study is preferred when examining contemporary events, but when the relevant behaviors
cannot be manipulated … the case study’s unique strength is its ability to deal with a full
variety of evidence — documents, artifacts, interviews, and observations” (p. 861).
Seeing as the SPE hack crisis is a contemporary event that has already happened, the
researcher could not manipulate any behaviors (i.e., experiment) or be on sight (i.e.,
observational study) to gather data as the case occurred. Therefore, the researcher relied
on existing evidence from multiple sources of information and multiple viewpoints to
understand the case as a communication crisis event. Baxter and Jack (2008) emphasize
the strength behind gathering multiple sources in that “each data source is one piece of
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the “puzzle,” each piece contributing to the understanding of the whole. This
convergence adds strength to the findings as various strands of data braided together
promote a greater understanding of the case” (p. 554). In the next section, I discuss how
the evidence was gathered and what type of evidence was analyzed in this study
Data Collection
To gain a holistic understanding of the Sony Pictures hack crisis, I used multiple
data sources that covered an array of multiple viewpoints to enhance the credibility of the
data gathered (Yin, 2013). These multiple data sources were utilized to triangulate the
data for a more accurate examination of the crisis event (Efthimiou, 2010).
For the purposes of this study, the data was collected from public communication,
various media outlets (e.g., magazines and newspapers), documented interviews, Sony
Pictures official statements, and documents authored by the United States Government.
Specifically, the sources reviewed included news articles released between November
24th, 2014 – January 2nd, 2015 from different publications and outlets. The articles were
compiled from the LexisNexis database by searching the following key terms related to
the event: Sony Pictures, Sony Pictures hack, the interview, and North Korea hack on
Sony pictures. Internal communication from Sony Pictures Entertainment as well as the
United States Federal Government related to the incident – newsletters, bulletins, official
statements, presidential orders, company emails, etc. – that were available for public
record were also gathered via these various publications. Finally, corroborated interviews
of Sony Pictures’ employees and government officials were also utilized to analyze the
case. Through this collection of multiple sources of evidence, I created an intensive
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examination of the Sony Pictures hack crisis, and explanation for how it unfolded and
why it interacted with the U.S. Federal Government to form a national security crisis.
Selection of Sources
To piece a definitive compilation of the case, I selected government-direct
statements and major American news outlets that covered the SPE hack diligently
throughout its occurrence and at its end. A total of nine sources were used to build the
case: six major news sources and three government-direct documents. The six news
sources included: The New York Times, Time Inc.’s FORTUNE, CNN, NBC News, and
Vanity Fair. In addition to being America’s elite news sources, these sources included a
variety of information to build their coverage. Rather than being a mere summary of the
hack’s happenings, these news sources included: interviews with SPE leadership and
employees, SPE direct emails, government officials’ statements, SPE official company
statements and bulletins, and FBI commentary for a cohesive and factual representation
of the SPE hack. The three government-direct documents included: White House Press
Releases, Department of State Press Release, and Department of Homeland Security
Press Release. These releases all included commentary from the at-time President of the
United States, Barack Obama, at-time United States Secretary of State, John Kerry, and
at-time United States Secretary of Homeland Security Jet Johnson. These news outlets
and government documents were selected as they all contained direct narrative from SPE
officials and government officials who were involved during the crisis. The nine total
sources allowed for a holistic understanding of the SPE hack internally, its interactivity
with the U.S. Federal Government, and its later evolution to a national security crisis.
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Selection of Timeline
A time period of six weeks, from November 24th, 2014 to January 2nd, 2015 was
selected for the examination and building of this case. The following is a description of
key dates within the timeline. On November 24th, the cyber hackers – Guardians of the
Peace (GOP) accessed and hijacked SPE’s computer database and server via malware
sent through email. Nov. 25th, SPE contacted the FBI and cyber-security firms to assist
with containing and fixing the hack and its damages. Dec. 2nd, SPE’s CEO Michael
Lynton and Co-Chairperson Amy Pascal publicly confirmed the severity of the companywide hack to the entirety of SPE. Dec 2nd – Dec. 4th, the GOP released multiple “data
dumps” where thousands of SPE’s private personnel information, emails, and production
data were leaked and shared with the public via various internet sites. Dec. 8th, GOP
confirmed that the film, The Interview was the reason for the hack and demanded that it
be removed from theaters. Dec. 8th – Dec. 15th, GOP released more confidential personnel
information, emails, and SPE production content. Dec. 16th, the GOP threatened a “9/11
type” terrorist attack against all the theaters that showed The Interview. Dec. 16th – 18th,
theaters cancel The Interview from showing. Dec. 19th, FBI confirmed that North Korea
was responsible for the attack. Dec. 19th, at-time government officials, President Barack
Obama, Secretary of State John Kerry, and Secretary of Homeland Security Jet Johnson
all gave public statements regarding the cyber-attack, SPE’s decision, and North Korea’s
involvement. Dec. 24th, SPE released The Interview digitally on select, online videostreaming platforms. Jan. 2nd, at-time president Barack Obama signed an executive order
that installed additional sanctions against North Korea in response to the hack and its
damages.
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November 24th, 2014 is used as the starting point for this study as it marks the day
that the GOP made threatening contact with SPE. Although, there are some reports that
indicated that a cryptic “warning” was made to SPE much earlier in June 2014 from an
unknown source; November 24th also served as the date that the hackers made initial
access into SPE’s database, and will therefore be used as the starting point for this case.
January 2nd, 2015 will serve as the case’s end point as it marks the day President Barack
Obama released an executive order that imposed additional sanctions against North
Korea. Also, by that time The Interview had already been released digitally by SPE and
seen both nationally and internationally by viewers. In the coming section, I provide an
explanation for how the data was analyzed using a descriptive case study method, which
includes theoretical proposition’s analysis strategy via the explanation building analytic
technique.
Data Analysis
Yin (2002) defines a case study as “a contemporary phenomenon within its reallife context, especially when the boundaries between a phenomenon and context are not
clear and the researcher has little control over the phenomenon and context” (p. 13).
Several approaches to analyzing data within case study research exist. The present study
uses a descriptive case study method. This approach stresses “prior development of
theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis” (Yin, 2002, pp. 13-14).
Thus, “Yin emphasizes the necessity that researchers review the relevant literature and
include theoretical propositions regarding the case under study before starting to conduct
any data collection, which distinguishes it from such methodologies as grounded theory
and ethnography” (Yazan, 2015, p. 140). Merriam (1998) explains that case studies can
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use purposive sampling to identify the best evidence that highlights the theoretical
concepts under scrutiny. Using this approach, case study research is highly descriptive
and does not require a more formal content analysis using coding of units of analysis into
themes. Rather, the criterion for assessing the validity of the analysis is how closely the
“best” evidence represents the concepts as established in the review of literature. If the
concepts have been clearly articulated and the supporting materials, often presented from
several sources, undoubtedly exemplify those concepts, then the argument for validity
should be strong. Data is evaluated in terms of its evidentiary and explanatory value
(Yazan, 2015).
Analysis of the evidence to build the case study relies heavily on the
conceptualizations of the relevant concepts and draws upon the review of the associated
literature. Therefore, the scholarly literature is incorporated throughout the study in a
manner that might be uncommon to other methods. The investigator “[draws]
systematically from previous knowledge and [cuts] down on misperception” (Stake,
1995, p. 72); concurrently, he or she “gives precedence to intuition and impression rather
than guidance of the protocol” (Yazan, 2015, p. 145). It is incumbent on the researcher
and reader to “[know] what leads to significant understanding, [recognize] good sources
of data, and consciously and unconsciously [test] out the veracity of their eyes and
robustness of their interpretations. It requires sensitivity and skepticism” (Stake, 1995, p.
50).
Additionally, Normal Accidents theory’s theoretical propositions were used to
guide the understanding of the case study (Yin, 2013). Normal Accidents theory’s
propositions were used to identify conditions for explanations on the case being
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examined. This descriptive case study allowed the researcher to link the case to concepts
specific to theory; which provided a sense of direction for how the data should be
analyzed (Yin, 2013). Additionally, the technique used in conjunction with this
descriptive case study is known as - explanation building – analyzing the case by building
an explanation for the case itself (Yin, 2013). Specifically, explanation building entails
identifying causal links to make sense of why and how the case unfolded in the manner
that it did. Also, to avoid any potential problems related to explanation building as an
analytic technique, the explanations created reflect the propositions identified in Normal
Accidents theory.
Theoretical Propositions
The following are Normal Accidents Theory’s theoretical propositions that were
used to guide the explanation building technique during the case analysis of this study:
Systems. “Systems are divided into [at least] four levels of increasing aggregation:
units, parts, subsystem, and system” (Perrow, 1999, p.70).
Complex Systems. “Systems that contain many interactions that require control,
and information about the state of components or processes that is more indirect and
inferential” (Perrow, 1999, p.83).
Accidents. “Damage to subsystems or the system as a whole, stopping the
intended output or affecting it to the extent that it must be halted promptly” (Perrow,
1999, p.70).
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System Accidents. “Unanticipated interaction of multiple failures” (Perrow, 1999, p.70).
Linear Interactions. “Expected and familiar production or maintenance sequence, and
those that are quite visible even if unplanned” (Perrow, 1999, p.78).
Complex Interactions. “Unfamiliar sequences or unplanned and unexpected sequences,
and either not visible or not immediately comprehensible. (Perrow, 1999, p.78).
Loose Coupled Systems. Systems where the interactivity between subsystems are not
dependent upon each other, allow for buffer, and adjustments to be made leniently.
Tightly Coupled Systems. Systems where interactivity between subsystems is very strict
and contains no slack. These systems contain all buffers built-in and do not allow for
adjustments or leniency during operation.
These theoretical propositions were used to guide the descriptive case study
analysis to ensure that a critical and valid explanation of the case was built. Moreover,
Normal Accidents theory was expanded to include additional propositions that accounted
for the interactivity between two separate, major complex systems during an accident of
one. Ultimately, this study’s results for the Sony Pictures hack crisis provide an
explanation for how the accident unfolded, and why it later became a national security
crisis. The following chapter describes in detail the SPE hack crisis case.
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CHAPTER IV - CASE ANALYSIS
This chapter reveals the specifics of the SPE hack crisis, how it later transformed
into a national security crisis, and describes key proponents that justify the crisis as a
normal accident. Specifically, this chapter provides background about the SPE case,
explores system failure, subsystem malfunction, and interconnectivity between systems
through a timeline narrative of the case study.
Sony Pictures Entertainment Hack: Was it really a crisis?
Crises are not “one-size-fits-all” but vary in type and intensity (Seeger, Sellnow,
& Ulmer, 2003). The SPE hack can be identified as an organizational crisis – “a specific
unexpected and non-routine organizationally based event or series of events which
creates high levels of uncertainty and threat or perceived threat to an organization’s high
priority goals” (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 1998, p. 233) induced by an act of cyber
terrorism. In this section, I will explore the SPE hack in three phases to build the case and
provide an analysis using Normal Accidents theory to make sense of its happenings;
Phase 1 – saying hello: the shakedown of the SPE database, phase 2 – flirting with
national security: confidentiality aflame, and phase 3 – it’s official: national security
crisis over The Interview.
Phase 1 – Saying Hello: The Shakedown of the SPE Database
There were no warning signs for SPE before it received its first hack email that
contained five links routing to SPE’s internal records by the hacker group identifying
themselves as the “Guardians of Peace” on the morning of November 24th, 2014 (Elkind,
2015, 66). The email read, “We’ve obtained all your internal data including your secrets
and top secrets. If you don’t obey us, we’ll release data shown below to the world.” This
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type of attack was foreign to SPE’s repertoire of crisis management and served as “a
specific unexpected and non-routine organizationally based event” (Seeger et al., 1998,
233). This email was the trigger event, a change in freedom to access resources of
importance related to the organizations daily “normal” operations (Stewart, 2000), which
lead SPE and its employees directly into the crisis stage. It served as a bifurcation point
where the organization’s operational normalcy was shaken into an uncertain chaotic
situation (Farazmand, 2003). SPE’s regular communication platform was at a standstill
and at the mercy of this unexpected event. Employees did not have computer, email, or
cellphone access, and this resulted in a shift from regular daily operations to operations of
crisis response to regain organizational normalcy.
The hackers’ initial email allowed for interactivity to ensue with the SPE’s
computer database. Regular operations using the SPE computer database company-wide
include the sending, receiving, and opening of emails; thus, this is considered a normal
phenomenon within the system. However, upon opening the initial hack email a complex
interaction occurred between the hacker’s email and the SPE database. The hacker’s
email served as one subsystem and SPE’s database served as the other subsystem. The
two subsystems being unrelated but now connected with each other prompted the
accident’s formation. Initially this unexpected sequence of interactivity between the
email and the database was not visible nor immediately comprehensible (Perrow, 1984).
It was not until SPE’s entire communication platform was shut down from the hack that
an understanding of what was occurring began to become clear for SPE and its
leadership. This shutdown marked the beginning of the accident in that various
subsystems became damaged leading to a system-wide halt of output for SPE.
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During this portion of the crisis stage SPE is interpreting the signal (unexpected
trigger event) and attending to its damages. Seeing as this crisis spanned over a long
period of time its initial onset did not induce severe emotional arousal as expected in a
traditional crisis. Initially, Amy Pascal’s (SPE at-time Co-Chairperson) reaction was that
it had to be a joke (Seal, 2015). However, being the acting leadership amidst the crisis
she persisted to investigate to ensure that her interpretation of the event was a plausible
one that led to effective action (Seeger et al., 2003). Through continued communication
leaders Pascal and Michael Lynton (SPE at-time CEO) eventually identified the
situation’s severity, and prompted SPE to take preventive measures to reduce the
probability of any data loss. SPE’s C.F.O, David Hendler ordered a complete shutdown
of the SPE computer database to prevent any further damage until the gravity of the issue
was assessed and fully resolved (Seal, 2015).
Phase one of the SPE hack highlights its legitimacy as a crisis as it contains an
unexpected event that lead the organization into uncertainty and away from normalcy.
This trigger event served as a bifurcation point upon the organization’s daily routine. This
point shifted the organization’s way-of-life. In addition to the complete shutdown of
SPE’s computer system, employees were instructed to disconnect from Internet access
across all their mobile devices and computers. This shut down and disconnect Weick
(1988) identifies as a form of enactment known as ‘safe inaction’ in interest of reaching
an accurate diagnosis of the problem until ‘dangerous action’ can be fulfilled to fully
resolve the crisis. Furthermore, this shift in the organization’s way-of-life and the
disconnect from normalcy highlights a total system accident (Perrow, 1984). A system
accident indicates multiple failures in various subsystems across one system. In this case,
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various communication subsystems within the SPE system were forced to shut down due
to the initial accident that was prompted by the hackers’ email. This one component
failure lead to multiple other failures throughout SPE that began to interact in
unanticipated ways: SPE employees being unable to access internet, communicate via
mobile devices, complete work-related tasks via their computers. In result, other business
ventures connected to SPE and its employees’ duties were thwarted during this timeframe
because of the system-wide accident induced by the complex interaction of the GOP
email and SPE’s subsystem.
Though a system shutdown was fulfilled and SPE did not succumb to negotiating
with terrorists at that point (Toros, 2008), phase one was only the initiation of a brewing
national security crisis that would extend beyond SPE’s organizational borders and into
the arms of the United States Federal Government.
Phase Two – Flirting with National Security: Confidentiality Aflame
In a crisis, “organizational members and the public often experience intense
emotional arousal, stress, fear, anxiety, and apprehension” (Seeger et al., 2003, p. 9). SPE
suffered eight information leaks throughout the hack crisis. Many of these leaks consisted
of early movie releases via pirating websites. However, one of the eight leaks released
confidential and personal information (i.e., Social security numbers, bank information,
credit card information, etc.) of 47,000 Sony employees (Wagstaff, 2014). This type of
sensitive information being released for public access via the Internet was detrimental to
the organization’s members who were directly affected. SPE in turn had to respond
accordingly to this massive security breach to ensure the overall safety of its employees;
as “an organization’s first impulse should be to acknowledge those harmed and do
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everything possible to assist them” (Seeger et al., 2003, p. 131). The leadership
immediately acknowledged the crisis and provided transparent communication for its
employees to manage the issue accordingly. Issue management is “the strategic response
to help organizations make adaptations needed to achieve harmony” (Heath, 1997, p. 3).
Pascal and Lynton sent a memo to all employees that served as a strategic response for
issue management:
It is now apparent that a large amount of confidential Sony Pictures Entertainment
data has been stolen by the cyber attackers, including personnel information and
business documents. This is the result of a brazen attack on our company, our
employees and our business partners. This theft of Sony materials and the release
of employee and other information are malicious criminal acts, and we are
working closely with law enforcement . . . While we are not yet sure of the full
scope of information that the attackers have or might release, we unfortunately
have to ask you to assume that information about you in the possession of the
company might be in their possession. While we would hope that common
decency might prevent disclosure, we of course cannot assume that . . . We can’t
overemphasize our appreciation to all of you for your extraordinary hard work,
commitment and resolve. (Peterson, 2014, p. 1)
Additionally, the FBI as well as multiple cyber-security firms were sought out to assist in
solving the crisis at hand (Seal, 2015). Though Sony was not responsible for the leaks
that occurred, since they were acts of terrorism, it was in fact responsible for its
employees. It is the role of the organization to take responsibility in reducing the intense
emotional and psychological stress that is experienced by its members (Seeger et al.,
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2003). Moreover, SPE’s employees not only suffered “emotional and psychological”
stress but they suffered damages towards their livelihoods, as one SPE employee, who
wanted to remain anonymous, stated in an interview with Fortune magazine:
Things became more clear when it was revealed what information was released.
Around Wednesday or Thursday, people started saying: call your bank, change
your passwords, set up a new checking account. I was completely irate. Once it
got personal, it was just, are you kidding me? Seeing the faces of colleagues with
families—they’re worried about their life savings, their retirement funds, their
kids. (Marikar, 2014, p. 1).
In turn, SPE had to conduct healing, particularly to build a new foundation for its
employees’ overall security. SPE accepted responsibility for the consequences suffered
by its employees and put together positive and progressive measures to overcome and
establish stability for its victims (Seeger & Ulmer, 2001).
Interestingly, many large corporations such as SPE have state of the art cyber
protection at their disposal that is specifically designed to be the main line of defense for
these types of hacks. As Perrow (1984) notes, complex systems have built-in safety
designs that are designed with the sole purpose to prevent failure. However, it is these
elaborate designs that make the system complex, if not more complex, and more difficult
to navigate through during an accident; and that is where SPE failed in its intervention
post the initial hack. Once the hack began to release confidential information of SPE
employees, the rationale of technological-determinism for the crises’ inception falls short.
As Vaughan (1996) highlights, in his expansion of Normal Accidents theory from a
technological-deterministic theory to a techno-social theory - human intervention plays a
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role in the unfolding of accidents, and in Sony’s case, crises. Upon receiving the initial
scare of a system-wide shut down by the hackers, SPE leadership should have intervened
(e.g., social action) accordingly to prevent any further damage from taking place, and
lives being negatively impacted. This turning point is similar to Vaughan’s (1996)
example of the Challenger normal accident: “no fundamental decisions were made at
NASA to do evil, rather, a series of rather seemingly decisions were made that
incrementally moved the space agency toward a catastrophic outcome’ (p. 410). There
was no intention from SPE leadership to allow the hackers’ continued damage to SPE;
yet, its lack of prompt change in behavior in response to the initial hack was the decision
that moved SPE to catastrophic outcomes internally (e.g., company and employees), and
catalyzed its coupling with the U.S. Federal Government.
The leadership of an organization has extensive power when it comes to decision
making especially during times of crisis (Le Coze, 2015). However, as Perrow (1986)
highlights, “organizations are tools in the hands of their leaders, but they are imperfect,
not completely controlled, tools, and it is a struggle to maintain control over them (p.
134). This is evident when SPE leadership assumed they were making the right decision
for the organization considering the initial hack. Its inability to control the happenings
within its own organization emphasizes the struggle that it takes to contain an accident
when it occurs within a system, if action is not taken quickly and appropriately. This is
because organizations are susceptible to their environments and are later shaped by them,
while also shaping the environment in return; a true interconnectivity between the
organization and external world (Perrow, 1986). Due to the lack of successful
intervention by SPE leadership, the entire organization became altered by the accident,
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and later the happenings within the organization transferred externally onto society
altering the nation’s security and creating a separate crisis.
Phase Three – It’s Official: National Security Crisis for The Interview
The GOP followed through on each of its cyber threats with precise and
destructive action. Initially, this cyber-attack was limited to the boundaries of the SPE
organization. However, upon leakage of confidential and personal employee information,
the tides turned, and the extent of the aggressor’s capabilities became evident and
tangible. Thus, SPE was faced with the challenge of responding to the situation
accordingly based on the newfound intensity and seriousness of the situation, while still
being open to its developing uncertainty. The seriousness of the situation had begun to
increase and it became clear to SPE that the initial crisis had spiraled into something
beyond its control; and thus, its responses had to become equally as sensitive to the new
extremity of the situation (Seeger et al., 2003). Henceforth, SPE’s response became
communicating the need for assistance from the Federal Government. The Federal
Government’s subsystem – the FBI – provided its assistance in assessing and containing
the hack to the best of its abilities.
This integration of the Federal Government’s expertise can be attributed to the
phenomenon known as the transformation process. The transformation process, as Perrow
(1984) explains, is the redesign of a system through the addition of operator experience to
reduce the possibility of interactions that are likely to cause an accident. In this case, the
assistance from the Federal Government serves as the addition of operator experience. Its
role was to identify how the hackers could access SPE in aim of reducing this
interactiveness to avoid further coupling, accidents, and future crises. The Federal
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Government brings experience that is rooted in its training against other national security
threats, which in turn transformed how the SPE crisis was ultimately handled. The
Federal Government’s expertise increased the knowledge needed to resolve the problem,
seeing as SPE was unable to fix it internally. Additionally, and important to note for this
study, this integration of the Federal Government’s expertise serves as the initiation point
for the between-systems interaction. Because not only is the Federal Government
providing its expertise, it is incorporating its relevant subsystems to assist in the
containment of the SPE accident. This between-systems interaction is to avoid further
impact from the SPE accident onto the Federal Government’s organization and its
stakeholders – the American people and their livelihood and security.
Amidst all this terror it was still unclear to SPE as to why they were being
targeted and why this was happening. Also, during this time SPE continued as planned to
release its movie The Interview on Christmas day. The Interview is a political satire that
revolves around the assassination of North Korean Supreme Leader, Kim Jong-Un, which
at the time was speculated (later confirmed) to be the catalyst for the cyber-attacks.
However, SPE never confirmed a connection between the cyber-attacks and the The
Interview, nor was it ever made known by the attackers to be the underlying reason for its
attacks. It was not until early December when an email from the GOP connected its
destruction to reason:
Stop immediately showing the movie of terrorism which can break the regional
peace and cause the War! You, SONY & FBI, cannot find us. We are perfect as
much [sic]. (Seal, 2015, p. 4)
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The GOP reign of terrorism had, through explicit and targeted communication - “FBI
cannot find us”, bifurcated beyond the walls of SPE and into the hands of the United
States Government.
In this moment, a “plausible explanation for the event” (Seeger et al., 2003, p.
127) was established and reasoning for this multi-level crisis was clear. Upon demanding
the removal of The Interview, the crisis became less targeted on the destabilization of the
SPE organization and more of an attack on the United States’ guiding principles,
particularly the first amendment – American freedom of speech. It sparked the attention
and action of major political figures. At-time Secretary of Homeland Security, Jet
Johnson stated:
The cyber-attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment was not just an attack
against a company and its employees. It was also an attack on our freedom of
expression and way of life. (Johnson, 2014, p. 1)
Furthermore, GOP followed up its demand with ultimatums identifying what would
happen if the removal of The Interview did not commence:
We will clearly show it to you at the very time and places. The Interview be
shown, including the premiere, how bitter fate those who seek fun in terror should
be doomed to. Soon all the world will see what an awful movie Sony Pictures
Entertainment has made. The world will be full of fear. Remember the 11th of
September 2001. We recommend you to keep yourself distant from the places at
that time. If your house is nearby, you’d better leave. Whatever comes in the
coming days is called by the greed of Sony Pictures Entertainment. All the world
will denounce the SONY. (Cieply & Barnes, 2014, p. 4)
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The GOP homed in on the United States’ familiarity with crisis intensity (e.g., September
11th) to convey the severity of what may happen if its demands were not met. Though the
Federal Government was not at the forefront of communication with the terrorists, this
had still become an instance of terrorist negotiation with SPE being at the helm.
Due to these threats to attack any theater that showed The Interview, many
theaters across the United States cancelled their showings and opted out of showing the
movie indefinitely (Cieply & Barnes, 2014). Afterwards SPE cancelled its Christmas day
theatrical release of The Interview and the movie was shelved until further notice. This
decision by SPE solidified in the eyes of the nation that the terrorists had won. It placed
the Federal Government in a greater predicament, as it portrayed the United States as
willing to succumb to terrorist demands, and forfeit its freedom of speech and expression.
This decision of compliance by SPE then prompted the involvement of the United
States President and Secretary of State. This action taken by major political figures that
are direct representations of the United States Government highlights the severity of the
situation and its inadequate handling. Leadership plays a crucial role during crisis
communication. A leader must be “visible, honest, attentive, open, and responsive during
a crisis” (Seeger, 2003, p. 241) in terms that respond to the crisis in accordance to the
population affected. Once again, SPE’s leadership did not react accordingly when they
met the demands of the terrorists showing incongruence to essential American values
(freedom of speech), and did not lead in terms of the population’s needs and values.
Additionally, since the terrorist attack had now become a national security crisis
the leadership had changed. Thus, the United States leadership felt required to respond
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with immediacy to the people, and be congruent with American values and principles
against this act of cyber terrorism. United States Secretary of State John Kerry stated:
The United States condemns North Korea for the cyber-attack targeting Sony
Pictures Entertainment and the unacceptable threats against movie theatres and
moviegoers. These actions are a brazen attempt by an isolated regime to suppress
free speech and stifle the creative expression of artists beyond the borders of its
own country. [. . .] Freedom of expression is at the center of America’s values and
a founding principle of our Bill of Rights. [. . .] That’s why the United States is
and always will be a staunch advocate for and protector of the right of artists to
express themselves freely and creatively. Whatever one’s system of government
or views about free expression, there is absolutely no justification whatsoever for
an attack like this. [. . .] This provocative and unprecedented attack and
subsequent threats only strengthen our resolve to continue to work with partners
around the world to strengthen cybersecurity, promote norms of acceptable state
behavior, uphold freedom of expression, and ensure that the Internet
remains open, interoperable, secure and reliable. (Kerry, 2014, p. 1)
Shortly after, United States President, Barack Obama during his end-of-year press speech
made the comment:
I think Sony made a mistake. We cannot have a society in which some dictators
someplace can start imposing censorship here in the United States because if
somebody is able to intimidate us out of releasing a satirical movie, imagine what
they start doing once they see a documentary that they don't like or news reports
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that they don't like, that’s not who we are. That's not what America is about.
(Perez, Sciutto, & Diamond, 2014, p. 1)
These statements made by the United States leadership indicate the depth of impact of the
crisis, its blossoming from simply being an organizational crisis to a national security
crisis, and its severity on the nation.
The Federal Government concluded that the North Korean Government
spearheaded the attack. An Executive Order by President Barack Obama was issued in
the wake of this cyber-attack that “imposed additional sanctions with respect to North
Korea” (The White House, 2015a, p. 1). This document blocked the North Korean
Government in dealing with “property or interests in property that are in the United
States” (The White House, 2015a, p. 1). Furthermore, President Obama issued legislative
proposal that would combat cyber threats and enhance cyber security (The White House,
2015b, p. 1).
The shift from a mere transformation process of assisting one system through the
inclusion of another’s system’s expertise, to a secondary system accident within a
separate system (Federal Government) occurred once the reason for the GOP’s attack was
made evident. Identifying The Interview as the motive behind the attacks connected the
hackers with North Korea, and its follow-up threats against the U.S. linked its behavior to
that of full-fledged terrorism that required national security intervention.
The U.S. Federal Government became the second system to suffer an accident at
the hands of the GOP and the poor decision making of SPE leadership. The stripping of
The Interview from theaters highlighted a direct attack on American values, which is a
guiding principle in various subsystems of the Federal Government, such as the
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Department of Homeland Security and the Secretary of State’s office. SPE’s fulfillment
with such demands loosely coupled the two systems, as they both failed in upholding
guiding American principles – American Freedom and refusal to negotiate with terrorists.
This interconnectivity between two major systems, SPE and the U.S. Federal
Government, indicates how a crisis can stem from a normal accident due to action taken
by leadership that later leads to the halt of its intended outcome (Perrow, 1986). Once this
transference in systems occurred, so did its leadership; and thus, the Federal Government
took control of the response efforts in attempt to regain normalcy. This type of response
effort from the Federal Government is unique in that the Federal Government did not
respond to the crisis on behalf of SPE and act as a proxy communicator (Liu, 2011),
because SPE did in fact respond to its crisis. What makes this interaction unique is that
the Federal Government communicated for itself on its own position and on how SPE
handled its system accident and the crisis that stemmed from it, not for SPE. Once the
initial accident transformed into a national security crisis, the crisis response became the
responsibility of the Federal Government in lieu of its mishandling by the initial failing
system. In turn, the Federal Government (the second system) deployed its system
resources and communication strategies to handle the crisis. Following, the concluding
chapter provides further insight to this complex interaction between systems by noting
this research’s findings, implications, limitations, and suggests directions for future
research.
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CHAPTER V - CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The purpose of this study was to examine the communicative underpinnings
surrounding the SPE hack accident that later transpired into a national security crisis. The
study was guided by the theoretical framework of Normal Accidents theory and literature
pertaining to complex organizations. Case study analysis was employed as the primary
mode of research to analyze the case. The results provided significant conclusions in
sociological and risk and crisis communication scholarship.
This chapter presents conclusions specific to the study’s research question:
RQ: How does the normal accident within one system (SPE) cause an accident within a
separate system (U.S Federal Government) that later transpired into a national security
crisis?
The chapter begins with conclusions related to the SPE hack as a justified crisis. I
provide results on the SPE crisis to explain how the malfunction of one subsystem
interacted with other subsystems to shut down an organization’s normal state of
operation. Second, I expand the Normal Accidents theory and detail new propositions
that help explain how two major systems interacted with one another to form an
independent crisis. Proposition 1) common denominator and proposition 2) common goal
are introduced, which allow Normal Accidents theory to account for the coupling
between two independent systems (SPE & United States Government) through non-linear
interactions. Next, the implications of the study are discussed. Then the areas for future
research are suggested. Finally, the limitations associated with this study are highlighted.
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SPE Hack: A Normal Accident in One System
Perrow (2011) defines an “accident” as a “failure in a subsystem or the system as
a whole that damages more than one unit, and in doing so disrupts the ongoing or future
output of the system” (66). The trigger event of the crisis shut down multiple units within
SPE post-hack. Once the GOP’s first email was accessed, multiple units of SPE’s
computer database were damaged, and afterwards these damages transpired into a
complete shut down of the studio’s production. The hack itself disrupted SPE’s output as
a company, due to all employees and ongoing projects being halted to assess the database
outage. SPE’s future output suffered because The Interview was removed from its
scheduled release in theaters. Its expected financial gain through the cinematic
distribution of The Interview across theaters nationwide was disrupted due to theaters
closing in reaction to the hack. Thus, the SPE hack is independently a within-system
accident as it identified the coupling between the SPE database, its film production, and
the film’s release in theaters across the United States. The failure of the SPE database
(subsystem 1) lead to the shutdown of studio daily operations (subsystem 2), and the
removal of the film’s release in theaters (subsystem 3).
Moreover, the crisis of SPE amassed victims, another identifier solidifying it as an
‘accident’. The release of employees’ private personnel information to the public served
as ‘victim exposure’ from damage during the accident (Perrow, 2011). The employees of
SPE are operators of the system who have an influence on the organizations’ operation,
and are so classified as ‘first-party victims.’ However, SPE employees in this particular
case are ‘second-party victims’, as Perrow (2011) notes these victims are “those
associated with the system as suppliers or users, but without influence over it. [. . .] They
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are voluntary actors who elect to participate in a system but have no influence over its
operation” (p. 68). Because SPE’s employees did not directly influence, as operators, the
accident’s creation to where it is classified as operator-error they cannot be categorized as
first-party victims in this case. However, since they voluntarily agreed to a contract of
employment with SPE they are obligated to accept any risks that stem from accidents
throughout the occupation within the organization.
Lastly, the SPE crisis serves as an organizational system accident that involved
unanticipated interaction through loose coupling between various subsystems that
resulted in multiple failures. The SPE database serves as one subsystem that was loosely
coupled with other subsystems like its employees’ performance, theaters’ operation
across the nation, and The Interview’s press circuit. Upon the failing of SPE’s database
these other loosely coupled subsystems failed, and in turn accounted for a system wide
accident. Next, I explain how two independent systems interacted with one another to
form a separate crisis.
How Two Independent Systems Suffered an Interconnected Accident
In this case, there existed two main systems that interacted: 1) Sony Pictures
Entertainment and 2) U.S. Federal Government. A system is the main governing
organization that is responsible for multiple sub-organizations that operate within it that
are accountable for playing its role in ensuring the intended output of the entire system is
fulfilled. Each system in this analysis contained varying subsystems that were impacted
by the crisis (e.g., SPE’s computer database and the Department of Homeland Security).
Moreover, certain subsystems, such as the FBI, from the U.S. Federal Government were
used to assist with crisis response in the SPE system accident. These complex interactions
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between these varying systems are loosely coupled since each system’s subsystems are
not dependent on one other for product output under normal operations. However, to
further understand how Normal Accidents theory can account for this case’s betweensystems complex interaction, this section will introduce and explain two new theoretical
propositions: 1) common denominator and 2) common goal, these expand the Normal
Accidents theory allowing it to account for and explain the coupling between two
independent systems through non-linear interactions.
Common Denominator
A common denominator is identified as a shared feature across multiple people or
a shared characteristic across different events. For the purposes of this study, a common
denominator is defined as - a guiding principle that is shared and serves dual roles across
different and independent major systems. This common denominator can serve as the
point of interaction between two independent complex systems, which is sufficient to
create a coupled state between the two. In this particular case study, both SPE and the
Federal Government’s mode of operation is guided by the following common
denominators – citizen security and American Freedom of Speech.
The two complex systems may not be aware of their shared common
denominator’s existence. If a system is aware of the common denominator it should
account for its function in its crisis planning, being mindful of potential between-systems
interaction. If a system is unaware of the common denominator during normal operations
it has no bearing on the system’s crisis planning. A system might become aware of the
common denominator when an unexpected non-linear change is experienced by one
system prompted by a crisis in a different system. Additionally, a threat to a common
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denominator shared by various organizations will not always prompt between-systems
interactions. For example, many organizations share democratic decision making as a
guiding principle, an attack on this principle in one organization may not disrupt other
organizations. This means a change in the common denominator under one system may
only affect that one system and its various internal subsystems. Thus, the common
denominator can produce two possible interactions: 1) within one system or 2) between
multiple systems.
A brief example of two local universities in the State of Mississippi interacting
with one another in response to a tornado that ravished one of the universities will better
explain the role of the common denominator within and between complex systems.
Hattiesburg, MS is home to both William Carey University and the University of
Southern Mississippi (USM). Under normal circumstances both universities are
adversaries in various metrics relating to university standing. Moreover, William Carey
and USM are two complex systems that usually operate independently of one another.
However, in January 2017 a tornado tore through the William Carey campus leaving it
severely damaged and out of commission for normal business operations. In response,
USM allocated its facilities to William Carey’s students and faculty so that William
Carey could maintain its responsibilities throughout the semester. The reason for this
intervention by USM to assist William Carey is because of the common denominator that
they both share as Mississippi Universities – the academic success and retention of
Mississippi based college students. Absent this common denominator that links these two
rival universities together there would be no motivating factor for USM to interact with
William Carey, an adversary. The tornado served as the threat against the common
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denominator and prompted a non-linear interaction between these two independent
systems. Without USM’s intervention to assist William Carey, the academic success and
retention of William Carey students would have suffered greatly. This suffering would
have in conjunction negatively impacted the overall academic success and retention of
Mississippi college students, which is a guiding principle that is actively upheld by USM.
Thus, this common denominator connected these two universities together in response to
the crisis of one university. The deterioration of one independent system’s ability to
uphold the common denominator prompted a separate system to intervene and contain the
crisis to prevent the crisis from expanding. In the example above, the inability to sustain
the common denominator in one system due to an existing threat is what lead for the
interconnectedness between two separate systems. Regarding SPE and the Federal
government, it was SPE’s failure to uphold the common denominator internally (within
system) in response to the cyberattack (organizational crisis) that lead to the coupling
between systems, and the manifestation of an even larger crisis at the national level with
the U.S. Federal Government intervening.
There were two common denominators that connected the two independent
systems, SPE and Federal Government to produce a national security crisis – 1) citizen
security and 2) American freedom of speech. The cyberattack on SPE was a direct
consequential threat on employee safety; and in response the federal government was
motivated to reduce further consequences on American people. Here the principle of
citizen security acted as the first common denominator that coupled the two systems (see
figure 1).
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Figure 1. Common Denominator 1 Between SPE and Federal Government

Figure 2. Common Denominator 2 Between SPE and Federal Government
The second being the ultimatum given by the hackers to remove The Interview from
theaters was an attack on American freedom of speech (see figure 2). These common
denominators served as linkage between both SPE and the Federal Government. The
cyberattack was a direct threat against these common denominators and SPE’s inability to
contain the threat accordingly lead the Federal Government to intervene, prompting the
resolution of a national security crisis. In addition to the common denominators, this case
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highlights that for two separate systems to interact during the crisis of one that another
element be met - common goal. Common goal is discussed below.
Common Goal
As noted previously in the review of literature, Perrow (1961) briefly discusses
the role that goals play in complex organizations. Perrow goes on to identify “official
goals” and “operative goals”. Official goals being the general-purpose statements made
by organizations to fulfill its legitimacy as an organization. And operative goals being the
underlying tactics that are put in place and used to achieve the official goals. However,
though official and operative goals are identified in the literature regarding complex
organizations; the interconnectivity of goals between two separate complex organizations
has not, nor has it been accounted for in Normal Accidents theory. Therefore, in this
section, I introduce ‘common goal’ as a new proposition in extension of Normal
Accidents theory to account for the interconnectedness of goals between systems during a
crisis.
In layman’s understanding, a common goal is a shared agenda for multiple people
or a shared mission across various institutions. For this study and the purpose of
expanding Normal Accidents theory, a common goal is defined as a general, shared
course of action that is sought and tailored by different and independent systems to
maintain congruency with their organizational values and principles. A common goal is
one of the overarching practices of a system that is utilized to meet the common
denominator, dependent on that common denominator’s individual responsibility within
the system and between systems. For example, if the common denominator is financial
longevity, the common goal would be achieving top line revenue growth markers year
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after year. Like the common denominator, a complex system can be either aware or
unaware of a common goal that exists between them and another system.
In the example of William Carey and USM noted previously, the two systems
ostensibly share a common goal – the provision of consistent and high-quality education
to Mississippi students. The common denominator that directly guides this goal is student
success and retention. If a threat were to ever impact either institution then that would
disrupt the common goal of either system, and connect the two systems. The complete
destruction of the William Carey campus by the tornado served as that threat and made
the university unable to meets its goal of providing a consistent and high-quality
education for its students. In turn, USM shared its resources with William Carey to
maintain this common goal and uphold the overall common denominator. Any threat to
the system becomes a threat to meeting its goal and upholding its guiding principles.
When these goals are common and systems have a common denominator, it transpires
into a between-systems crisis rather than merely a within-system catastrophe.
SPE and the Federal Government have two common goals that were negatively
affected that resulted in a national security crisis: 1) maintenance of system security and
2) autonomously create and share modes of expression. The security breach that released
47,000 SPE employee social security numbers, financial records, and personal
information indicated that this terrorist group if they wanted to, through means of
cyberterrorism, could hack into the Federal Government and harm other Americans by
disseminating their personal information. Therefore, the SPE hack on employee
information directly impacts the first common goal. Further, the potentiality of it
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occurring beyond SPE walls served as a threat to American security, and merited national
security involvement.
The SPE’s compliance to the terrorist demand of removing The Interview from
theaters was a clear violation of the second common goal as it directly prevented SPE
from sharing its art. This compliance from SPE misrepresented the United States and
portrayed it as a nation willing to succumb to terrorist demands regarding what the U.S.
can and cannot produce and transmit, stripping the U.S. of its autonomy to express.
United States leadership in turn acted immediately against this threat by making
statements in opposition of SPE’s compliance towards stripping the movie. The Federal
Government’s intervention because of SPE’s failure to manage the crisis appropriately
and maintain the common goal solidified the coupling between the two systems as the
SPE organizational crisis transformed into a national security crisis. The hindrance on
these common goals perpetuated further nonlinear interactions between SPE and the
Federal Government. Also, it showcased how two independent complex systems can be
coupled together due to the accident in one that threatens against the common goal.
In sum, the addition of the common denominator and common goal propositions
into the proposition repertoire of Normal Accidents theory expands the theory’s ability to
explain multiple systems interaction. Rather than only accounting for the
interconnectivity of subsystems within one complex system, these propositions allow
Normal Accidents theory to be used in evaluating how two separate complex systems
have the potential of coupling with one another via the identification of their common
goals and denominators. Next, this chapter explores the implications that this case study
provides the discipline of risk and crisis communication.
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Implications
This section identifies the implications of the SPE hack case study. First,
implications related to the expansion of Normal Accidents theory are discussed. Second,
the common denominator and common goal and their role in Normal Accidents theory is
addressed. Finally, the use of these concepts by crisis communication practitioners is
determined. To start, the implications of Normal Accidents theory are noted.
Expansion of Normal Accidents Theory
Perrow (1984) introduced Normal Accidents theory as a theory to explain why
complex systems contain accidents. He noted that systems contain subsystems that are
either loosely or tightly coupled, which allows them to interact with one another and that
a disruption in one subsystem may lead to the failure of the entire system due to its
interconnectivity with other subsystems. However, Perrow only discussed the accidents
that stem within a single system and did not mention the possibility of a between systems
accident. This case study expanded Normal Accidents theory so that it could explain how
two independent systems can interact with one another in response to one system’s
accident. It showcases that organizations share commonalities that once disrupted in one
organization could potentially impact another. Crisis communication scholars should be
more cognizant of these commonalities to better plan for the potentiality of a crisis
occurring between systems. These commonalities are the common denominator and
common goal, the following section discusses their role within Normal Accidents
Theory.

54

Common Denominator and Common Goal
The common denominator and common goal provide an accentuation for how two
independent systems can find themselves interconnected in light of a crisis impacting one
of them. The common denominator indicates the shared common principles that each
system carries. The common goal is the shared course of action carried out to uphold a
certain common denominator. This case depicts how both SPE and the U.S. Federal
Government share common denominators and goals that once thwarted at the helm of the
cyber-attack lead to their coupling as systems and a national security crisis. The
identification of the common denominator and common goal provides crisis
communication practitioners with a vantage point for communication strategy
development between two separate organizations. Furthermore, these propositions
provide a linkage that explains how a private organization like SPE can interact with a
public entity such as the U.S. Federal Government in response to a crisis. Strategies that
would help organizations better communicate with one another to accommodate the
potentiality of a crisis impacting them simultaneously. The utilization of these concepts
in crisis assessment, crisis response development, and crisis planning will deem
beneficial in the pre, during, and post stages of a crisis. The application of these
propositions is addressed in the following section.
Application of New Propositions
Practitioners should utilize these propositions to initially identify the probability
of an interaction between two independent organizations during the crisis of one. The
uncovering of interconnectedness between organizations could lead to extensive crisis
prevention plans that take into consideration the motivation that exists and prompts

55

interaction with another organization in aim of resolving the crisis. For example,
Hollywood production companies are now more alert in their crisis planning to the
assistance of the Federal Government in relation to cyber security threats that
compromise their organization’s safety and product output. Furthermore, awareness of
common denominators and common goals will allow practitioners to assess past crises
with more diligence to better uncover the underlying reasons for interconnectedness
between systems. Also, with the common denominator and common goal in mind,
practitioners can be more thoughtful in their crisis response development so that they
uphold the systems’ common denominator(s) and continue to meet the systems’ common
goal(s) without the risk of magnifying the already existing crisis. For example, if crisis
communication practitioners at the time of the SPE hack crisis were vigilant to the
common goal – autonomously sharing modes of expression – then they could have
responded differently, by not complying to the terrorist demands, and in turn would have
prevented the organizational crisis developing into one of national security.
This section highlighted the implications that stem from the SPE hack case.
Implications related to the expansion of the Normal Accidents theory and what it means
to the field of crisis communication was noted. The implications revolving the addition of
the common denominator and common goal as theoretical propositions were discussed.
Finally, implications on the application of these new propositions by crisis
communication practitioners was addressed. In the following section, areas of future
research are explored.
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Future Research
This case study has provided significant additions and expansions to Normal
Accidents theory that enhance the scholarship and practice of crisis communication. This
section notes the academic and practical directions that can be made through the findings
of this research. First, research exploring existing cases that contain the theoretical
propositions provided in this study is proposed. Secondly, research related to cases that
may contain only one of the propositions, or an evolution of either of the propositions,
and how that affects a crisis is addressed. Finally, research focused on enhancing the
understanding of accidents that occur between systems using the modified Normal
Accidents theory is suggested. Research areas in existing cases are noted first.
Existing Cases
This case study highlights how the coupling of two independent complex systems
is possible and can be determined using the modified Normal Accidents theory.
Currently, there exist cases that have shown signs of the theoretical propositions
proposed in this study, and they should be assessed using this modified Normal Accidents
theory to better understand the interconnectedness taking place between separate systems
during a crisis. One case being the William Carey University tornado crisis and its
coupling with the University of Southern Mississippi. An assessment of this case could
enlighten other academic institutions nation/worldwide on how to interact with
neighboring institutions for help in response to a natural disaster crisis impacting their
campus. Another case is the FBI vs. Apple Inc. encryption dispute. Its unfolding could be
studied using the new Normal Accidents theory propositions to make sense of how the
FBI and Apple became interconnected systems in response to the 2015 San Bernardino

57

attack. Both organizations shared the common denominator – American security and
privacy; however, they were at opposing ends on how they handled the crisis and the
roles they each played as independent organizations while interacting. These cases, if
studied using the new propositions suggested in this study would provide novel insight to
the crisis communication discipline in further understanding between-system interaction.
The following section addresses how future research should examine obscure cases that
do not contain both propositions simultaneously, but each proposition individually and
how that impacts the crisis and systems.
Obscure Cases
The SPE hack crisis uncovers the existence of both the common denominator and
common goal operating simultaneously amidst a crisis. However, not all betweensystems crises will contain both propositions, some may contain one or the other, or
different evolutions of these propositions. For example, future studies could explore the
possibility of uncommon denominators and uncommon goals. In other cases, it is likely
that the same denominators and goals that are common between two separate
organizations may also contradict one another dependent on the specific crisis and based
on how each organization chooses to respond.
Ultimately, it is vital for the crisis communication discipline to study cases that
contain these evolutions as well as only one proposition during a crisis and assess how
these variations change the progression of the crisis, the relationship between the two
affected systems, and any other subsequent analyses. This type of research will indicate
which of the propositions carries more weight in impacting the interconnectedness
between systems in a crisis, and whether the propositions’ opposing evolutions have any
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impact on the case and its end result. Uncovering such insight will allow crisis
communication practitioners to develop crisis plans that are geared towards addressing
each specific proposition to better handle the intricacies of the accident.
Between-System Accident Dynamic
Currently, there is not much existing research that studies uses Normal Accidents
theory to study the interaction between two independent complex systems during a crisis,
especially systems of varying nature – private vs. public. Existing research using Normal
Accidents theory primarily focuses on strictly one system, its subsystems, how the system
is affected by a crisis, and a crisis communication strategy for within-system response.
However, from this case study it is evident that more cases involving between-systems
interaction in face of a crisis should be looked at using Normal Accidents theory; in order
to identify fresh perspective on future crisis communication and strategies. If more
research revolving between-systems interaction is conducted it will provide the crisis
communication discipline with further scholarship that supports a means to accommodate
these unique crises. Furthermore, with more between-systems focused research new
expansions to theories such as Normal Accidents theory will occur allowing us to better
study future cases with more versatile theories. It is essential to conduct this type of
research so that organizations become aware of their interconnectivity with other
organizations. And crisis communication practitioners can then teach organizations’
stakeholders how to navigate within this potential interconnectedness during times of
accidents and crisis. Next, I address the limitations of this research.
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Limitations
The following section will consist of a forthright discussion of the limitation of
this research. Specifically, I address the information outlets utilized to compile the data,
and the types of sources used as data for this case. Initially, I explore the information
outlets used in this project.
Information Outlets
For this study, only American news outlets and government documents were used
and examined for the case. International news outlets, and the North Korean
Government’s communication may have provided a different perspective on the case and
the crisis’s unfolding. However, seeing as the U.S. was the victim in this crisis, it made
sense to narrow the frame of reference to that of the American media for consistency in
coverage and government communication. Following, I address the types of sources used
to build this case and how it is a potential second limitation.
Data Source Type
Only existing sources were used to build the case. Should the study have included
interviews of SPE employees (i.e., victims of the hack) conducted by the researcher, the
shaping of the case may have been different. Nonetheless, the media outlets acquired for
this study contain interviews with both SPE employees, leadership, and government
officials; which all support the building of the case’s timeline and happening from those
directly impacted and involved. Ultimately, future studies involving the SPE hack of
2014 could include information from international news outlets and international
government documents to broaden the perspective of the case. Furthermore, direct
interviews by the researcher with SPE employees, leadership, and government officials

60

who were either involved or impacted during the hack would potentially provide a deeper
understanding of the crisis and how it unfolded.
Overall Conclusion
Accidents occur in organizations and are deemed normal, especially when these
organizations are complex ones. The Sony Pictures Entertainment hack crisis of 2014
spiraled into a national security crisis that required the intervention of the United States
Federal Government. This crisis was a unique organizational crisis as it connected a
private organization and public entity, who normally would not interact with each other,
in response to one system accident. Normal Accidents theory accounts for within-systems
accidents arising from subsystem interconnectedness and malfunction. However, it does
not explore the interconnectedness of two separate systems in response to a crisis in one.
This case study expanded Normal Accidents theory and used it to explain the
interconnectivity between two separate, major complex systems.
Consequently, this crisis proved a worthy case study for crisis communication
scholars and practitioners. It displayed a novel phenomenon that limited crisis
communication research has explored: between private and public organization
interaction during a high stress crisis event analyzed using Normal Accidents theory. This
research, using the SPE hack crisis as its primary case, expanded normal accidents theory
by introducing two new propositions: 1) common denominator and 2) common goal, that
accounted for between-systems interaction during a crisis. Moreover, the study answered
its research question: the reason for why an accident in one system can lead to an
interaction within a different system and later catalyze a separate crisis is because of the
harm to the systems’ common denominators and common goals. This study demonstrated
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the importance of the common denominator and common goal in identifying the potential
coupling of two systems in light of a crisis. This research provided progressive impact to
the risk and crisis communication discipline through its expansion of the Normal
Accidents theory and practical findings. The SPE hack crisis which later became a
national security crisis is a strong case study for assisting in the development of future
crisis responses, crisis planning, and crisis assessment.
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